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COLLABORATION AND THE COLORADO
RIVER COMPACT
Patricia Mulroy*
On December 13, 2007, at the Colorado River Water Users Association’s
annual conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, the Secretary of the Interior signed a
historic Record of Decision approving adoption of interim guidelines for the
management of shortages in the Lower Colorado River Basin and the coordi-
nated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.1  The decision is historic
because it outlines—for the first time in the history of the Colorado River
Compact—specific guidelines for addressing shortage conditions among the
three states in the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, and Nevada), as well as
for coordinating the operation of Lakes Powell and Mead under low water con-
ditions for the benefit of states in both the Upper and Lower Basins.  The
guidelines, in turn, substantially reflect the collaborative thinking and input of
the seven basin states, as provided to the Secretary of the Interior on February
3, 2006,2 and April 30, 2007,3 as part of the Department of Interior’s two-year
public involvement plan for the development of shortage criteria on the lower
Colorado River.
As noted by the Record of Decision, the guidelines include:
♦ [establishment of] discrete levels of shortage volumes associated with Lake Mead
elevations to conserve reservoir storage and provide water users and managers in
the Lower Basin with greater certainty to know when, and by how much, water
deliveries will be reduced in drought and other low reservoir conditions;
♦ a coordinated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead determined by specified
reservoir conditions that would minimize shortages in the Lower Basin and avoid
the risk of curtailments in the Upper Basin;
♦ a mechanism to encourage and account for augmentation and conservation of
water supplies, referred to as Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS), that would mini-
mize the likelihood and severity of potential future shortages; and
* General Manager, Southern Nevada Water Authority.
1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDE-
LINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS OF LAKE POWELL
AND LAKE MEAD (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strate-
gies/RecordofDecision.pdf [hereinafter RECORD OF DECISION].
2 Seven Basin States’ Preliminary Proposal Regarding Colorado River Interim Operations
(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/consultation/
Feb06SevenBasinStatesPreliminaryProposal.pdf.
3 Letter from the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming Governors’ Representatives on Colorado River Operations to Dirk Kempthorne,
Sec’y of the Interior (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStates.pdf (regarding comments on the Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages,
and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead).
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♦ the modification and extension of the Interim Surplus Guidelines through 2026.4
The new guidelines implement interim reservoir operations that are
designed to minimize shortages in the Lower Basin and avoid the risk of cur-
tailments in the Upper Basin through an operating strategy for Lakes Powell
and Mead that strives to balance the water supply between these reservoirs,
while maximizing their use.  The guidelines replace the existing Interim Sur-
plus Guidelines by extending the Interim Surplus Guidelines through 2025 with
amendments that (a) remove the partial domestic surplus category; (b) limit
domestic surpluses for the Metropolitan Water District to 250,000 acre-feet, for
Arizona to 100,000 acre-feet, and for the Southern Nevada Water Authority
(“SNWA”) to 100,000 acre-feet during the years 2016 through 2025; and (c)
implement shortage conditions when Lake Mead’s elevation is at 1075 feet or
lower.  The guidelines also provide an opportunity for Lower Basin states to
develop, store, and access intentionally created surplus (“ICS”) water through
extraordinary conservation efforts, tributary conservation, system efficiency
projects, or importation of non-Colorado River water into the mainstream of the
Colorado River.  In any one year, the creation of extraordinary conservation
ICS for California, Nevada, and Arizona will be limited to 400,000 acre-feet,
125,000 acre-feet, and 100,000 acre-feet, respectively, while the maximum
amount that California, Nevada, and Arizona can accumulate at any one time is
limited to 1.5 million acre-feet, 300,000 acre-feet, and 300,000 acre-feet,
respectively.  These limits do not apply to other categories of ICS water availa-
ble to Nevada.
The Record of Decision also activates an existing agreement between the
seven basin states5 to pursue interim water supplies, system augmentation, sys-
tem efficiency, and water enhancement projects within the Colorado River sys-
tem, including but not limited to importation of new sources of supply from
outside the Colorado River Basin and desalination of ocean water or brackish
water.
The decision and interim guidelines are a major advancement in the man-
agement of Colorado River water resources, one with significant benefits to
Southern Nevada.  Beyond the advantages cited above, the guidelines provide
for the development of procedures that will allow Nevada’s pre-compact tribu-
tary and imported groundwater water resources to be introduced, conveyed
through, and diverted from the Colorado River system.  Ninety-five percent of
this water would be recoverable and available during any shortage and would
contribute to return flow credits.  As the SNWA pursues development of addi-
tional, available groundwater supplies within Nevada, this procedure will pro-
vide an opportunity for the SNWA to extend the use of these new supplies
significantly.  Second, the guidelines allow Nevada to participate in the imple-
mentation of system efficiency projects such as the Drop 2 Reservoir along the
All American Canal in California and the Yuma Desalting Plant in Arizona, as
4 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 1, at 4 (citation omitted).
5 Letter from the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming Governors’ Representatives on Colorado River Operations, supra note 3, at
Attachment A (Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations), avail-
able at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/Basin-
States.pdf.
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well as future augmentation projects.  Participation in the Drop 2 project alone
will give Nevada access to a one-time supply of water (at least 400,000 acre-
feet) that can be accessed in future years on an as-needed basis.
The Record of Decision was specifically the result of a public process that
began in 2005 when the Secretary requested input from the seven states of the
Colorado River Compact and other stakeholders regarding development of
additional operational guidelines and tools to meet the challenges of the ongo-
ing drought in the Colorado River Basin.  In actuality, however, the decision is
the product of a decades-long interaction among the seven basin states—an
interaction that has helped to clarify issues and concerns, develop effective
working relationships among all the parties, and establish trust and commit-
ment on matters of regional and national importance.  As a result of their col-
lective history and experience, the seven basin states have learned how to move
forward and address water management challenges incrementally, while work-
ing steadfastly to meet the water supply needs of individual states and
communities.
Unfortunately, there is no magic formula for success in this type of
endeavor.  While there are advantages to interstate water compacts in meeting
regional and local water needs, and although one cannot overstate the impor-
tance of collaboration in managing activities and defusing potential conflicts
when or where water is scarce, neither is a substitute for the hard work and
compromise that ultimately produces results in the face of competing interests
and needs.
Over the past eight years, the sustained drought in the American West and
the reality of climate change gradually altered historical understandings of the
Colorado River and challenged many underlying assumptions about the river’s
long-term management.  In response to these new conditions, the seven states
of the Colorado River Basin and numerous communities that depend on the
river for water began to adjust infrastructure plans, further improve water effi-
ciency, and take steps to develop additional unused water supplies to maintain
the reliability of their delivery systems.  In only a few years, the river’s many
stakeholders had to accept and respond to this “strategic inflection point” in
their collective history as stewards of the river and its life-giving water.6  Their
ability to do so is a testament not only to the flexibility inherent in the original
Colorado River Compact, but also to the pragmatic and collaborative working
relationship that has developed between the seven basin states, particularly in
the past twenty years.
The recent success in the Colorado River Basin stands in stark contrast to
the ongoing water challenges facing communities in the southeastern United
States, where drought and climate change have impacted water supplies with
equal severity, and collaboration and formal compacts among states have yet to
resolve ongoing water challenges facing major communities such as Atlanta.
6 The phrase “strategic inflection point” was coined by Andrew Grove of Intel Corporation
to describe a business situation where the fundamentals of the business change, requiring
new approaches in order for the business to adapt successfully and remain viable.  The con-
cept applies to any situation where standards, conditions, or expectations are supplanted,
either slowly or suddenly, by new ones that challenge the established order of things, result-
ing in a crisis point. See ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE (1996).
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To put this into perspective, it is worth briefly comparing the success of the
seven states in the Colorado River Basin with the challenges faced by Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.7
Each basin is the principal surface-water source for one of the fastest growing
metropolitan regions in the United States,8 and each has been the subject of an
interstate river compact.  However, whereas the seven states in the Colorado
River Basin have extensive experience wrestling with the equitable allocation
of their river through an interstate compact, such is not the case with the states
of the Chattahoochee.9  The Colorado River Compact was first envisioned in
the early 1900s and subsequently approved by Congress in 1922,10 but the
Chattahoochee Compact, formally known as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint River Basin Compact, was not signed into law by Congress until 1997.11
Even then, the Chattahoochee Compact did not last long, expiring on August
31, 2003, after Florida refused further extension of negotiations on allocation
formulas.12  Since that time, much of the Chattahoochee conflict has become
litigious, focusing on lawsuits over water management of Lake Lanier and the
prospect of having state apportionments allocated by judicial fiat.
This is far from ideal, but not unusual.  In fact, people often forget that the
Colorado River Compact of 1922 was only the first in a series of negotiations,
agreements, and court cases that collectively comprise what is now called the
“Law of the River.”  Early negotiations on the river among the states of Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming were
unable to reach agreement on apportionment for each of the states.  As a result,
the states subsequently agreed to divide the Colorado River evenly between the
Upper and Lower Basins (7.5 million acre-feet for each basin).  It would be
another six years before allocation among the Lower Basin states would
occur,13 more than twenty-five years before allocations for each of the Upper
Basin states would be established,14 and more than forty years before the allo-
cations among the Lower Basin states would carry the kind of certainty they
have today.15  Given the tortuous history of the Colorado River Compact, it
should come as no surprise that Alabama, Florida, and Georgia have yet to
resolve the allocation and management of the Chattahoochee in any definitive
manner.
While it is premature to declare the Chattahoochee situation a failure, it
has become a very real crisis for the greater Atlanta area, now home to over
7 For brevity’s sake, I will simply refer to the basin as “the Chattahoochee” for the balance
of this article.
8 Las Vegas and Atlanta.  Las Vegas depends on Colorado River water stored in Lake
Mead, while Atlanta depends on Chattahoochee River water stored in Lake Lanier.
9 Benjamin L. Snowden, Student Article, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty:  Under-
standing the Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134 (2005).
10 Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
11 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. Law No. 105-104, 111
Stat. 2219 (1997).
12 Josh Clemons, Water-Sharing Compact Dissolves, WATER LOG, Nov. 2003, at 1, availa-
ble at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/MS-AL/Water%20Log/23.3watershare.htm.
13 See Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057.
14 See Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
15 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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half of Georgia residents and dependent on the Chattahoochee River and Lake
Lanier for the majority of its water supply.  Having allowed the original Chatta-
hoochee Compact to expire, the three states are forced to address such crisis
points without the benefit of institutional trust or an established framework for
resolving conflicts.  Instead, they find themselves negotiating critical needs
such as a drought response plan while under the watchful eye of the federal
government.16
This is a point often overlooked when assessing the real value of com-
pacts.  The Colorado River Compact was formed
to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the
Colorado River System; to establish the relative importance of different beneficial
uses of water; to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of present and future
controversies; and to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial development
of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters, and the protection of life and
property from floods.17
Similarly, the Chattahoochee Compact was formed “for the purposes of pro-
moting interstate comity, removing causes of present and future controversies,
equitably apportioning the surface water of the [Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint River Basin], engaging in water planning, and developing shared common
data bases.”18  Both compacts were intended not only to apportion available
water supplies from their respective river systems, but also to establish forums
for resolving conflict and creating “interstate comity.”  In other words, a com-
pact does not mark the final stage of problem-solving, only the beginning.
This has certainly been true for the Colorado River Compact.  As noted
above, the 1922 Compact left a great deal undecided, but it also provided a
strong, yet flexible framework in which each state was given a greater degree
of certainty about its water situation.  Only then could the states individually
and as a group really begin the long and arduous journey of more detailed
negotiations over issues and concerns.19  Almost a century later, the wisdom of
this approach can be seen in work products such as the recent Seven Basin
States Agreement and interim shortage guidelines.
The drought and growing reality of climate change are helping to demon-
strate the value of the Colorado River Compact and the collaborative mettle of
the seven basin states.  As others have noted, compacts are powerful collabora-
tive tools whose full utility is limited only by the will and creative instincts of
the participants.20  Having negotiated complex water relationships in the West
for over twenty years, I am convinced the best arrangements are those in which
parties demonstrate a willingness and commitment to (1) collaborate with one
another, (2) share risks and benefits equitably, and (3) construct agreements
that are binding but alterable through good-faith negotiation and the unanimous
16 At the time of writing, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Department of the Interior
were working to develop a Tri-State Drought Plan by February 15, 2008.
17 Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. I, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
18 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. Law No. 105-104, art. I,
111 Stat. 2219, 2219 (1997).
19 See Frank J. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People,
States, and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 158.
20 Snowden, supra note 9.
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assent of all the participants.  While the precise tools for achieving this may
vary on the basis of factors unique to each situation, the underlying principles
of participation, risk sharing, and empowerment generally cannot.  By honoring
these core principles, any arrangement’s potential for conflict, gridlock, or fail-
ure is greatly reduced, if not eliminated.  As the recent work of the seven basin
states affirms, there are few challenging issues that a participatory process can-
not handle as long as these principles are in evidence and respected.
The seven states of the Colorado River Basin have spent much of the past
century working through some of the most complex, contentious water resource
issues imaginable.  They will undoubtedly continue to do so into the future, as
new challenges arise.  Yet their collective experience demonstrates the
profound value of working together to resolve seemingly intractable problems,
rather than resorting to litigation or the kind of protracted conflict or competi-
tion that results in winners, losers, or nothing at all.  By embracing the need for
cooperation and partnership implicit in the Compact, balancing our competing
needs and demands, and reaching out to share our experiences and solutions
with others who are facing similar challenges, the seven basin states are setting
new standards for resource management that will see our communities—and
the Colorado River—through events such as the drought and climate change
well into the future.
